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Forthcoming in Organization Studies 
Abstract 
We address the effect of organizational theories on the organization by focusing on how 
modularity, a widespread and influential organizational theory, performs a modular 
organization. While scholars have offered opposing arguments for the influence of this 
theory ± i.e. that it either succeeds or fails to µproduce¶ modular organizations ± we show just 
how and how far modularity is enacted and shapes the organization, and how it may be 
shaped in turn. Drawing on recent advances in performativity theory we thus contribute to 
modularity by showing how the modular organization emerges over time as the outcome of 
performative struggles among competing and complementary theories and how these 
struggles contribute to modifying the theory aQGµGHVLJQing¶RUJDQL]DWLRQV:HDOVRadd to 
performativity by theorizing the competition between multiple theories, the emergence of 
XQH[SHFWHGFRQVHTXHQFHVRUµerrors¶, and their implications for organizational practices and 
boundaries.  
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Introduction 
Modularity is a core organizational and management theory which, in the past decade or so, has been 
adopted and implemented by an increasing number of manufacturing organizations in sectors varying 
from electronics to automotive. As a theory (Baldwin and Clark, 2000), it has provided the tools to 
theorizHWKHWUDQVLWLRQIURP&KDQGOHU¶VYHUWLFDOO\LQWHJUDWHGPXOWL-divisional firm (Chandler, 1977) to 
the vertically specialised corporation characterised by a disintegrated and geographically dispersed 
value chain (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). As a strategy, modularity has allowed firms to organize 
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complex products and processes more efficiently (Baldwin and Clark, 1997). According to its 
proponents, the decomposition of a complex system into discrete sub-systems with loose-coupling - 
and the associated decentralised coordination via standardized interfaces ± has helped firms 
streamline their products and operations, whilst benefiting from autonomous innovation and 
managing complexity (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996).   
 
Modularity therefore appears to do more than organize products: in some important respects, it also 
appears to produce organizations.  Precisely how, and to what extent this might be the case, however, 
has been a matter of contention. With regard to the influence of modularity over the organization, the 
scholarly debate has seen different positions take hold. Whilst some have emphasized the power of 
modularity rules to produce modular organizations (Simon, 1962; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Ulrich 
and Eppinger, 1995; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Schilling, 2000; 
Sturgeon, 2002; Langlois, 2003), others have suggested that this relationship may be more 
complicated (Brusoni et al., 2001; Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001; Takeishi, 2002; Chesbrough, 
2003; Hobday, Davies and Prencipe, 2005; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006).  In this latter respect, authors 
have pointed to the discrepancy between product and organizational architectures and how this is due 
to contingent factors that ultimately impinge on the ability of modular design rules to bring about 
modular organizations. This insight has led scholars to argue for the need to look beyond abstract 
design rules to uncover the additional variables that regulate the fit between product and 
organizational architectures. Evolving organizational knowledge and skill bases (Brusoni et al., 2001; 
Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001; Takeishi, 2002; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006), for example, are seen 
to be amongst the key features that contribute to µdesigning¶ organizations (Brusoni et al., 2001).  
 
Extant approaches to the study of modularity therefore appear to be offering contrasting explanations 
about the influence of modularity over the organization. Modularity rules, thus, may wield a strong 
influence such that they produce highly modular, almost Lego-like, organizations (Sanchez and 
Mahoney, 1996), or they may instead have little or no effect, or even the opposite effect where they 
may EULQJDERXWµQRQ-PRGXODU¶RU HYHQµLQWHJUDO¶RUJDQL]DWLRQs (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006). In 
capturing some fundamental aspects of how modularity may succeed or fail to produce modular 
organizations, both schools of thought have implicitly suggested that modularity design rules can 
potentially have a wide range of effects. In focusing either on the power of modularity rules to 
produce modular organizations (the mainstream approach), or their failure therein (the contingency 
approach), however, extant contributions have left the spectrum of intermediate outcomes, 
PRGXODULW\¶V µperformation space¶ largely under-theorized.  
 
Addressing this gap involves developing a more comprehensive theoretical account of the range of 
effects of modularity rules over the organization. This includes theorizing the micro-level mechanisms 
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that may support or hinder the translation of modular products into modular organizations and how 
these mechanisms might shift dynamically, in context and over time. This analytic endeavour calls for 
new ways to conceive of and study modularity not simply as the direct outcome of design and 
outsourcing strategies, but as a process, that is an effortful, on-going, constantly challenged and 
negotiated accomplishment. In turn, it entails relinquishing interpretations of modularity as a solid and 
discrete feature of products and/or organizations, to study it as an emergent phenomenon, one which 
is deeply and inextricably entangled with the social and material ± or sociomaterial - practices that 
perform it (Barad, 2003; Beunza et al., 2006; Langley and Tsoukas, 2010; Darr and Pinch, 2013). A 
micro-level, situated and dynamic perspective, we posit, would afford important insights into the 
study of modularity and the influence of organizational theories more generally.  
 
Studying modularity as an enacted and emergent property of products, technologies and organization 
is a relevant and timely endeavour which however requires new conceptual tools. Drawing on recent 
advances in economic sociology (Callon, 1998) and the sociology of finance (MacKenzie, 2006), and 
related advances in organizational theory (Cabantous and Gond, 2011), we advance a performative 
perspective on modularity. While building closely on extant mainstream (Baldwin and Clark, 2000) 
and contingency-based approaches (Brusoni et al., 2001; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006), this view 
captures the dynamic relationship between theory and organization in its complexity. Our research 
questions are as follows: how and how far is modularity performed, in an actual organizational setting 
and over time? What is the influence of the organizational context on the performation of modularity 
rules? And what are the wider implications for theorizing the performativity of organizational 
theories, and the mutual shaping of organizational theories and the organization? We begin by 
introducing the notion of performativity.  
Conceptual background 
The performative effects of theories 
7KHUHLVDQLQFUHDVLQJDZDUHQHVVRIWKHOLQNVEHWZHHQRUJDQL]DWLRQDOWKHRULHVDQGWKHLUµSHUIRUPDWLYH¶
effects. In recent years, performativity-inspired approaches drawing on practice theory (Suchman, 
1987; Schatzki et al., 2001), science and technology studies (Latour, 1987; Pickering, 1995; Callon, 
1998; MacKenzie, 2006) and contemporary philosophy (Butler, 1993; Mol, 2005; Barad, 2007) have 
been gaining increasing recognition in mainstream organizational and management theory (Beunza 
and Stark, 2004; Ferraro et al., 2005; Cabantous and Gond, 2011).  
For instance, authors have described theories as constitutively shaping the design and performance of 
management practices and institutional arrangements, the social norms that regulate organizational 
and individual behavior, and the language, categories and assumptions that actors use to interpret the 
world around them  (Ferraro et al., 2005). Further contributions have argued for the need to study 
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organizations as sets of relations recurrently performed and reproduced over time and space 
(Orlikowski and Scott, 2008). According to these authors, organizational boundaries should never be 
conceptualized as solid or static but as constantly emergent and enacted in recurrent activities 
(Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011). A similar observation applies to organizational practices or routines: 
the routines¶ostensive - or abstract - pattern can never be taken for granted but needs WREHµbrought to 
life¶ every time through situated performance and enactment (Pentland and Feldman, 2008).  
In this paper we focus on a recent perspective on performativity which has emerged out of studies of 
economic and financial markets as this, we believe, can provide a particularly useful template for 
conceptualising the influence of organizational theories. Authors in this stream of work have 
suggested that theories and models are not simple descriptions of a setting but SRZHUIXOµHQJLQHV¶
which can profoundly transform the contexts they describe (MacKenzie, 2006). The key tenets of neo-
classical economic theory, for example, do not simply describe the economy but are actually being 
performed within markets (Callon, 1998). Such is the strength of this performation that markets come 
to resemble the theory. Similarly, the mathematical models that underpin financial derivatives 
(theory) do not simply rest outside the market (reality) but are a constituent part of it (MacKenzie, 
2006, MacKenzie and Millo, 2003). This, however, does not imply that theories are deterministically 
applied (MacKenzie, 2009). Rather, they are enacted through iterative cycles of µframing¶, where 
theories begin to shape reality, µoverflowing¶, whereby differences emerge between reality and the 
theory, and µreframing¶, whereby there is again convergence between theory and reality (Callon, 
1998). These contributions thus provide the basis for a study of the emergent effect of theories over 
markets or organizations.  
This dynamic approach, we suggest, is especially useful in highlighting how the influence of theories 
is never complete, and may vary significantly in degrees and levels. MacKenzie (2006), for example, 
has distinguished between theories that - when they are applied - have no or little observable effect on 
DVHWWLQJµJHQHULF¶SHUIRUPDWLYLW\WKRVHWKDWµPDNHDGLIIHUHQFH¶LQVRPHZD\µHIIHFWLYH
SHUIRUPDWLYLW\¶WKRVHWKDWEULQJDERXWWKHµVWDWHRIDIIDLUV¶IRUZKLFKWKH\DUHDJRRGµHPSLULFDO
GHVFULSWLRQ¶µ%DUQHVLDQSHUIRUPDWLYLW\¶DQGILQDOO\WKRVHWKHRULHVWKDWFKDQJHHFRQRPLFSURFHVVHV
VRWKH\FRQIRUPOHVVZHOOWRWKHLUGHSLFWLRQE\WKHRULHVµFRXQWHU-SHUIRUPDWLYLW\¶Through 
foregrounding the dynamic adaptation between theory and reality, performativity can help us account 
for the nuanced and dynamic effects of modularity, and wider organizational theories, on the 
organization. 
Performativity: Key Notions 
In order to understand how performativity can help us capture the co-production of modularity and the 
modular organization, we first need to look closer at its language and features. To this purpose we 
introduce four of its key constructs, starting from the notion of theory. Theories are understood 
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EURDGO\DVLQFOXGLQJ³>«@IRUPXODVPHWKRGVWRROVDQGLQVWUXPHQWV as well as verbal IRUPXODWLRQV´
(MacKenzie et al., 2007:15). In the context of this paper, for example, the dominant theory relates to 
WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VLPSHUDWLYHWRIROORZD ³>«@strategy of modularity [which] entails both belief 
³WKLVLVWKHEHVWFRXUVHRSHQWRXV´DQGFRPPLWPHQW³ZHDUHJRLQJWRIROORZWKLVFRXUVH´WR
PRGXODULW\´&DUOLVV%DOGZLQSHUVRQDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQ$WKHRU\LVFRQVLGHUHGµVXFFHVVIXO¶ (Callon, 
2007), or performative, when it brings about the vision of the world contained within.  
 
In order to become performative, a theory or statement has to create a sociomaterial assemblage, or 
agencement (Callon, 1998), our second key notion. This must contain the theory and all the elements 
required to realize it (Callon, 2007), including a heterogeneous collection of material features 
(including technology, texts, and bodiesWKDW³SDUWLFLSDWHLQLWVGHVLJQHODERUDWLRQH[SHULPHQWDWLRQ
change, maintHQDQFHH[WHQVLRQDQGRSHUDWLRQ´&DOORQand Caliskan, 2010: 23). Thus for a theory to 
be performative, it has to involve a heterogeneous configuration of actors and materials that supports 
its assumptions.  
 
A third key idea, one which is as yet underdeveloped in the literature, is that the effect of a theory can 
only be decided in relation to other theories. Multiple theories typically coexist at any one time within 
any organization. Some of these may be complementary, whilst others may compete and clash 
substantially or irremediably (Callon, 2007). In order to theorize the influence of a theory in its 
context and over time, we thus need to take a further step and capture how it may operate µat large¶, 
that is in conjunction with other organizational theories and their rules. So far, for example, little is 
known about ³>«@how alternative [theories] compete within organizations >«@through 
³SHUIRUPDWLYHVWUXJJOHV´&DEDQWRXVDQG*RQG, 2011: 582) DQG³LQIOXHQFHEHKDYLRXUVDQGRXWFRPHV´
(Cabantous et al., 2014). In the case of modularity, this includes theorizing the process by which the 
modular organization emerges over time and the (organizational and contextual) sociomaterial 
dynamics that underpin its inner workings.  
 
The point about sociomateriality takes us to a final key tenet. In a context where multiple statements 
struggle to establish themselves, one at the expense of the other, the potential of a theory to gather 
strength and prevail is closely related to its ability to involve not only actors but also artifacts and 
material devices (i.e. texts, documents, technologies). For example, by delegating their objectives and 
views DVµVFULSWV¶$NULFK, 1992) to stable, durable and visible artifacts such as software, flowcharts or 
computer systems, actors might, at least in principle, be able to reinforce their own views and 
objectives over those of other agencies (i.e. organizational communities, functions or teams) that are 
not so well equipped (Callon and Muniesa, 2005). Performativity therefore provides opportunities to 
theorize the sociomaterial mechanisms that underpin the co-evolution of organizational theories and 
the organization.  
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Methods 
Research context 
To capture the influence of modularity theory over the modular organization we draw from an in-
depth, longitudinal study of a pioneering electronics manufacturing firm ± an early producer of 
workstations, storage and high-end computer servers - whose history has been interwoven with the 
history of modularity in important ways. As part of our investigation, we were able to establish the 
presence of close historical links between this company and modularity theory from the early years 
when this company was a fast-rising high-technology start up.  Sources report how the pioneering 
methods used by this organization to manage its design and production activities had generated an 
early interest in management scholars towards understanding the laws that underpinned modularity 
and its principles, therefore directly inspiring the ground-breaking Harvard research on modularity 
(Russell, 2012). From the beginning, in the early 1980s, the company pursued modularity as an 
efficiency-seeking strategy aimed at streamlining and standardizing products and operations. The 
ILUP¶V progressive vision of modularity, which supported at the same time superior performance and 
cost efficiencies, by mixing and matching standardized third-party components, allowed it WR³solv[e] 
a critical paradox of computing´ (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). This ³open systems strategy´ (company 
archives) in turn gave the company outstanding advantage over those competitors which were 
following more conventional µFORVHG¶trajectories (West, 2003). 
 
A relentless faith in modularity distinguished the company from its competitors from the outset. 
Everything LQWKHLUV\VWHPZDVPRGXODU³>«@Irom the lowest level circuits within microprocessors 
to the highest level system software and application programmes. Its products could be connected 
easily to one another and other systems, like so many digital tinker toys´company press archive). 
The cRPSDQ\¶Vflamboyant CEO was himself a strong advocate of modularity. In his public speeches 
he often drew from the Lego metaphor, the shorthand for modularity, by comparing their products to 
³>«@D car built out RI/HJREORFNVWKDW>ZLOO@DOOILWWRJHWKHUYHU\QLFHO\DQGLI\RXGRQ¶WOLNH>RXU
component], take that Lego EORFNRXWDQGSXW>DFRPSHWLWRU¶V module@LQLW´ (ibid). From the early 
1980s, therefore, and throughout the FRPSDQ\¶Vphenomenal hike up the electronics industry ranks for 
the rest of the 1980s and the 1990s, WKHFRPSDQ\¶s belief in the power of modularity appeared 
unshakable.  
 
The emphasis on modularity remained strong even when, during the mid-nineties, the company 
switched from building only workstations ± aimed at the expert engineering user who could 
independently resolve any reliability issues that might have arisen - to high-end enterprise servers - 
aimed at the less competent corporate end user. The acquisition of a new server product line, 
purchased through a multi-million dollar deal that had made the history of computing, had in fact 
   '¶$GGHULR	3ROORFN- Performing Modularity 
 
7 
 
highlighted potential tensions between modularity and WKHIXUWKHUUDWLRQDOHRIµreliability¶. Reliability 
appeared to gain relevance in a server context, where computers are used to run mission-critical 
activities in organizations such as hospitals, banks and internet service providers, which are unable to 
tolerate any significant server downtime. 5HOLDELOLW\WKXVWKUHDWHQHGWRFKDOOHQJHPRGXODULW\¶VVRIDU
uncontested dominance in the company strategy, vision and value set. 
 
Even the acquisition of the new server product line (including the very same server which is the focus 
of this study), and the new reliability ethos supported by the various management and computer 
experts that had come across with it, however, did not dampen the FRPSDQ\¶V enthusiasm towards 
modularity. Modularity made mixing and matching components appear a straightforward activity 
which was unlikely to bear any repercussions on the performance of other components or on the 
system as a whole (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). Modularity and reliability were thus not considered 
incompatible as, in a modular product, any errors and defects detected during testing could be, at least 
in theory, µVZDSSHGRXW¶RIWKHV\VWHPVLPSO\E\ replacing any failed standardized modular 
components with new ones (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). According to our practitioners this principle 
applied to workstations as much as servers, the latter simply requiring more extensive testing 
compared to the former, in order to detect and swap any potentially defective components.  
 
Modularity and reliability thus appeared (initially at least) to happily coexist side by side. The 
FRPSDQ\¶V&(2illustrated the supposedly harmonious relationship between reliability and 
modularity in computers LQDVSHHFKZKHQKHVWDWHG³,PDJLQHLI,KDGDQDLUSODQHKDQJDUDWKRPH,
designed my own plane from different parts, and ,WROG\RXWRIO\LW,WZRXOGQ¶WEHVDIH\HWWKDW¶V
wKDWZH¶UHGRLQJ´SUHVVDUFKLYHVEncouraged by this high-level rhetoric which acknowledged the 
importance of reliability but at the same time relegated it to the background, the company basked in 
the certainty that modularity would continue to reign unchallenged. And reign it did - at least for 
another few years. 
 
Between the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new century the electronics sector bubble 
finally burst. We were already working on site when the company began to realize that profit margins 
were significantly shrinking. The effect of the crisis was to create a strong drive towards further 
efficiency/cost cutting which was to be achieved through modularity and further standardization. The 
CEO, at this point, SUHGLFWHG³>«@DµPDVVLYHVWDQGDUGL]DWLRQ¶LQWKHZD\WHFKQRORJ\LVGHSOR\HGDQG
GHYHORSHG´ (press archive). This move was supported by an even greater emphasis on modularity, not 
only at the product but also at the organizational level which provided greater flexibility to switch 
suppliers to acquire the latest innovations and best practice. This also allowed increasingly delegating 
production and testing activities for (both non-core and core but non-critical) components to external 
manufacturers thus relinquishing responsibility for component-level faults and avoiding the costs of 
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repair. It is therefore during this period that the company¶VEHOLHILQWKHSRZHURIPRGXODULW\began to 
take hold even further. Modularity, and the associated quest for superior efficiencies, was going to 
lead them out of the crisis.  
 
In the spectrum spanning from integrality to modularity, they therefore set out to place themselves at 
the far modularity end by adopting a totally µdisintegrated¶ organizational structure (something which 
however they were never fully able to realize, as we discuss later). They intended to achieve this by 
becoming the µperfectly modular¶ organization. This involved focusing on one or few core modules 
and activities and co-ordinating the rest thURXJKDUP¶VOHQJWKWUDQVDFWLRQV (Campagnolo and Camuffo, 
2009). The principle behind this involved buying rather than making: they would no longer need to be 
manufacturers but would become perfect integrators (Hobday et al., 2005) focusing their capabilities 
on assembling computers out of third party components. It was precisely DWWKLVWLPHWKDWWKHµUework 
and repair¶ process IRURQHRIWKHLUVHUYHUV\VWHP¶VFRUHFRPSRQHQWV, the computer board that is the 
focus of this study, was outsourced to its external manufacturer.  
 
The drive towards standardization/efficiency thus seemed inexorable. Further down at the 
organizational level, this involved an increased push WRZDUGV³VWDQGardised work procedures (across 
departments and business units) and documented steps, the presence of electronic databases, and 
procedures and systems for transferring knowledge across projects and business units´ (Campagnolo 
and Camuffo, 2009: 276). As part of this, the company started looking for additional efficiency-
bearing strategies which would allow production costs to be reduced while further streamlining their 
processes. The µ]HURLQYHQWRU\¶ philosophy, for example, which includes the Autoswap system which 
we discuss later, involved introducing new IT-based lean tools that would allow them to substantially 
reduce inventory overheads. It was not yet evident at this stage that the increasing emphasis on 
efficiency, supported by product and organizational modularity and complementary inventory rules, 
could conflict with reliability with important consequences for the organization.   
 
In the sections that follow we analyze the rise and fall of modularity within and beyond the 
boundaries of this outstanding organization. In so doing, we focus on the performation of modularity 
and complementary efficiency-bearing rules and their confrontation with the competing rules 
underpinning the philosophy of reliability. Through an in depth case study focusing on the changes 
that occurred in context and over time to the board rework and repair process we theorize how and 
how far modularity was able to prevail over reliability and produce a modular organization. 
Data collection and analysis 
Exploring the contrasting forces that drive towards - or away from - the modularization of product and 
organization requires the close observation of organizational processes to identify changes occurring 
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to product, technology and organizational interfaces. To this purpose we draw inspiration from the 
notion RIDQµDUWLIDFW¶VELRJUDSK\¶ (Appadurai, 1986; Pollock & Williams, 2009) which consists in 
following the key stages of a technology¶VOLIH-cycle and the practices and routines that surround it, as 
they develop over time and across contexts. Drawing on the biographical approach, we mapped the 
changes occurring to the computer board rework and repair routine over time, as rework was 
outsourced and later on re-insourced. To this purpose, we followed the rework routine at different 
stages to see how this changed as a consequence of the rework being conducted in-house or at the 
VXSSOLHU¶VSUHPLVHV7KLVHQWDLOHGµfollowing the board around¶ as it crossed the boundaries between 
supplier and integrator in a typical repair cycle.  The biographical approach provided us with insights 
into modularity and its innermost workings, including how it might affect the emergence of 
organizational boundaries. 
Participant-observation 
Our evidence, based on the detailed observation of production and testing operations at an electronics 
manufacturer, was gathered during a wider three-year ethnographic study during which the first 
author was a resident researcher. Direct, daily observation revealed the micro-level, situated 
organizational dynamics by which modularity was performed, thus providing the basis for a rich 
µethnography of modularity¶. Throughout that period, the researcher enjoyed privileged resident 
status, involving open access to people and facilities for the purpose of observation and interviews. 
This comprised access to meetings, including those involving suppliers (face-to-face, telephone- and 
video-conferences and online). The quality and extent of access allowed us to capture in detail the 
rework and repair (Orr, 1990; Pentland, 1992) routine as it unfolded in space and time (Balogun and 
Johnson, 2004).  
Semi-structured interviews 
,QWHUYLHZVZHUHFRQGXFWHGDWWKHPDQXIDFWXUHU¶VSUHPLVHVZLWKpractitioners operating at different 
organizational levels, sites and functions. Additional interviews were conducted with supplier 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVZKLOVWRQYLVLWDWWKHLQWHJUDWRU¶VSUHPLVHVas well as with resident suppliers 
µSHUPDQHQWO\¶ situated in a dedicated and clearly demarcated section of the shop floor. Due to the 
idiosyncratic, situated and highly technical nature of interviews, there was no unified, standard 
protocol. Interviews were instead tailored to specific issues, project stages, portions of the process, 
and individual respondents (taking into account their organizational rank and expertise).  
Company databases and archives  
Additional longitudinal data relating to periods preceding our direct involvement on site was gathered 
E\DFFHVVLQJWKHFRPSDQ\¶VLQWHUQDODUFKLYHVCrucially, our researcher was also assigned a place 
within the organizational hierarchy (seven handshakes from the CEO) which came with a corporate 
digital ID card and email account. These DOORZHGµanywhere and anytime¶ remote access to company 
data and archives, including the opportunity to subscribe to internal alias lists. This proved 
instrumental for capturing both internal and external exchanges (i.e. across functions, teams and the 
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integrator/supplier boundary). The data obtained through direct observation and participation in 
FRPSDQ\¶VDFWLYLWLHVZDVLQWHJUDWHGZLWKLQ-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted across most 
organizational functions and levels.  
Data Analysis 
The data analysis and coding was undertaken jointly by both authors. The first author, acting as the 
µLQVLGHU¶ZDVDEOHWRGUDZXSRQWKHVXEVWDQWLDONQRZOHGJHDQGH[SHUWLVHDFTXLUHGWKURXJKher 
extended engagement with the research site to formulate possible explanations. The second author, 
DFWLQJDVWKHµRXWVLGHU¶SOD\HGDVWKHGHYLO¶VDGYRFDWHRerup and Feldman, 2011) in challenging 
those emerging explanations. The second author also contributed towards analysing the data by 
proposing explanations that were either accepted or refuted by the first author, based on her intimate 
knowledge of the field (ibid). 
 
Alongside this dialectical role play we proceeded to analyze the data consistently with an inductive, 
µJURXQGHGWKHRULVLQJ¶DSSURDFK*ODVHUand Strauss, 1967). This involved proceeding in an iterative 
manner, scanning the extensive field data for recurrent concepts and themes, consolidating these into 
emergent categories (Nag et al., 2007), and subsequently evolving categories through constant 
comparison with related notions in the extant theory. This process led to developing new concepts, 
themes and dimensions, which captured how modularity was performed over time and within the 
context of the rework process.  
 
Through applying the techniques of content analysis (Krippendorff, 2003) and constant comparison 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967) we were able to identify a number of emerging first-order codes (Van 
Maanen, 1979).  Initially, notions surfacing from the observation of the rework process and interview 
WUDQVFULSWVUHYROYHGDURXQGFRQFHSWVVXFKDV³VZDSSLQJ´³PRGXODUSURGXFWV´³LQWHUFKDQJHDEOH
FRPSRQHQWV´³DIOH[LEOH RUJDQL]DWLRQ´³PL[DQGPDWFK´³RSHQLQWHUIDFHV´³GHOHJDWLQJ
UHVSRQVLELOLW\´DQG³WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQDVa /HJRV\VWHP´$WDODWHUVWDJHDOWHUQDWLYHQRWLRQVEHJXQWR
WDNHKROG7KHVHUHYROYHGDURXQGFRQFHSWVVXFKDV³IL[LQJ´³IDXOW-ILQGLQJ´³DUHOLDEOH SURGXFW´³DQ
error-IUHHRUJDQL]DWLRQ´³GHEXJJLQJ´³HUURUV´³TXDOLW\DVDWRSSULRULW\´³ZHPXVWQHYHUIDLO´
³RZQLQJWKHSUREOHP´DQG³IDLOXUH-is-not-an-RSWLRQ´)XUWKHUD[LDOFRPSDULVRQ6WUDXVVand Corbin, 
1990) between and across the codes revealed that these converged around two main patterns, which, 
XVLQJWKHLQIRUPDQWV¶ODEHOV9DQ0DDQHQ, ZHFRGHGDV³VZDSSLQJ´DQG³IL[LQJ´ 
 
The juxtaposition of these emergent categories with those in the relevant literature produced a crucial 
GLVFRYHU\HDFKVHWRIFRQFHSWV³VZDSSLQJ´RU³IL[LQJ´ZDVODUJHO\FRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHUXOHVDQG
assumptions typical of a specific organizational theory, modularity or reliability, as it may be played 
out in an actual organizational context. Put in other words, our sets of first-order concepts pointed to 
the fact that the principles of modularity and reliability theory were distinctly at work within the 
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rework process, as highlighted by the fact that their rules and their effects were being constantly 
invoked during the course of everyday actions and discourses. This creative - but firmly grounded - 
leap (Suddaby, DOORZHGXVWR³OLIW´RXUILUVW-order codes to a more abstract level and led to 
coding (modularity and reliability) rules and errors as second-order themes. In addition, field quotes 
also showed how rules were supported by being embodied, embedded and enacted (Martha Feldman, 
personal communication) in and through heterogeneous ensembles of artifacts and communities 
which appeared to exert a key influence over the rework process and its outcomes. This led us to code 
artifacts and communities as further second-order codes.  
 
Constant immersion in the data (Langley, 1999) combined with comparison against the extant 
literature allowed us to take our analysis to a further level of abstraction. As the evidence clearly 
indicated, modularity and reliability rules were not simply nominally present, but were being enacted 
and were shaping the rework process. This, in turn, suggested that modularity and reliability theory 
and their assumptions were having an effect on the process. The second creative leap in our analysis 
thus involved the realization that capturing the patterns emerging from the field required a framework 
able to explain the effect of organizational theories over organizational processes. Our search for a 
µWKHRU\RIWKHRULHV¶RUµmeta-theory¶ led us to engage with performativity theory¶V emergent 
constructs. This insight led us to characterize the effect of the rules and errors over the rework process 
LQWHUPVRI³IUDPLQJ´DQG³RYHUIORZLQJ´(Callon, 1998) and the influence of theories on the rework 
SURFHVVDV³SHUIRUPLQJ´RXUoverarching dimension). This process led to developing a new 
framework which theorizes how modularity was performed over time within the context of rework. 
 
Finally, further examination of interview and observation data confirmed that the balance of power 
between the two theories was unstable. This was highlighted by the fact that terms pointing to 
³IL[LQJ´RU³VZDSSLQJ´ZHUHDOWHUQDWLYHO\JDLQLQJDQGORVLQJHPSKDVLVRYHUWLPH)ROORZLQJWKHVH
key insights, we were able to identify three temporal stages which captured the co-performation of 
modularity and reliability over time and within the board the repair cycle: Stage 1- swapping 
prevailed almost unquestioned whilst fixing remained in the background; Stage 2- swapping and 
fixing were opposing each other in every aspect and at every level of the rework cycle; and Stage 3- 
swapping prevailed once again but this time was modified.   
  
While drawing on a single case, our findings afford further generalizable insights about the complex 
relationship between modularity theory and the modular organization, and, more in general, 
organizational theories and the organization. Powerful generalisations (Siggelkow, 2007; Feldman 
and Orlikowski, 2011) can in fact result from combining strong inductive theorizing with a practice 
perspective (Schatzki et al., 2001) based on performativity theory (Callon, 1998; MacKenzie, 2006), 
which involves embracing the complexity and ambiguity of organizational life and emphasizing its 
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multiplicity and emergence. A deeply grounded inductive approach drawing on in depth and 
longitudinal case study evidence can therefore provide fertile terrain for theory development.  
 
Performing modularity in the board repair cycle 
 
The biography of a computer board 
To capture the influence of modularity and its rules we draw from the detailed study of the computer 
board µrework and repair¶ cycle. A computer printed circuit board is a flat insulating sheet to which 
integrated circuits and other components are attached and is a critical component of the overall 
computer server system (Soanes and Stevenson, 2005). Servers are complex, customized, high-
performance, -quality and -reliability machines that provide essential services across a network of 
computers. For example they can be used to host databases, files and web email. They are individually 
configured to contain several printed circuit boards, based on their performance and customer 
specification. Our server can contain up to thirty-six boards, which can perform together or as thirty-
six individual computers.  
 
There are several reasons why a board might fail: it can contain fabrication defects, it can become 
damaged during transportation, or it can be accidentally broken through manual or robot handling in 
the factory. Whatever the source of failure, this has to be identified and corrected. Repair must be 
followed by thorough tests to verify that the fault has been fixed. Undetected board-level faults are in 
fact likely to generate system failures that can occur at any stages of the product life-cycle.  
 
While being a crucial aspect of high-end server production, the fault-finding and bug-fixing process 
appears at first sight to be rather simple and repetitive. The reality, however, could not be more 
different. The repair process is situated at the front line of the emergence and persistence of the 
modular organization, reflecting some of the key tensions that contribute to make an organization 
truly, or at least partially, modular. This is because it is precisely in this kind of context that 
organizational processes and boundaries are typically re-negotiated. In the following sections, we set 
out to follow the computer board around the rework and repair process, as it unfolds across the 
boundaries between systems integrator and component supplier.  
Stage 1- Modularity µrules¶  
In the early days following the acquisition of the server division from an outstanding competitor 
organization whose fate was declining, board rework and repair activities were conducted in-house, in 
a dedicated portion of the shop floor known as WKHµFailure Analysis¶(FA) area. Here, specialist tools 
and training were made available to technicians to ensure that repairs were conducted in a focused and 
timely manner. This all changed following the onset of the downturn in the electronics industry. Fully 
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embracing a modular production strategy led our firm to focus on systems design and integration, 
while mostly delegating the production of specialist product components (including computer boards) 
to their external manufacturers. This provided the organization with the increased flexibility to switch 
suppliers, as well as increasing or decreasing production following the fluctuations in demand that are 
typical of this sector (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Sturgeon, 2002), especially at a time of crisis. 
 
There was another consequence to the modularization of production and production-related 
knowledge, one that is mostly unacknowledged in the extant literature which locates product testing 
activities entirely within the boundaries of the systems integrator organization (ibid). Following the 
outsourcing of board production, key problem-solving routines such as fault-finding and failure 
recovery, which had been until then conducted in-house, had become distributed across the 
integrator/supplier boundary. This generated some important implications which we identify by 
examining the computer ERDUG¶VUework and repair cycle at the time of fieldwork (Figure 1). 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
A computer board is produced at the VXSSOLHU¶V facility where it undergoes basic testing. It is then 
shipped to the systems integrator where it is put through further advanced testing trials. When a fault 
is found and a board needs to be repaired (or reworked, in technical jargon) it is sent back to the 
supplier which then issues a new board and sends it to the integrator in exchange for the defective 
one. The supplier repairs the defective board and sends it out again to the integrator as a new board, as 
further requests for materials come through. Once it arrives at the integrator, the repaired board is 
once again scanned and put through the testing process. This process, as observed at the time of 
fieldwork, appeared to be in all respects very efficient and straightforward. This was until the day in 
which a rather low key and seemingly harmless email was circulated around the organization. 
³1RFORVHGORRSRQWKH)DLOXUH5RRW&DXVH´ 
The email below came from a Senior Manager from another production site, who was about to join 
the facility to lead the product engineering aspect of a large transition project.  
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 16:58:31 -0700 (PDT) 
From: Lead Product Engineer Lead.Engineer@ComputerCo.com 
Subject: Re: Localised Rework 
To: TransferTeamAlias@ComputerCo.com 
 
I would like to discuss doing in-house rework on [server family name] products in [your manufacturing 
location]. >«@ 
 
 [Right now, at your site] there [seems to be] no closed loop on the Failure Root Cause to update the 
WHFK¶s understanding of the failures. >«@ 
 ,DPDFWXDOO\JRLQJWRIRUZDUGVRPHRIWKLVGLVFXVVLRQWRWKH),1$2PDQDJHUV¶DOLDV,WKLQNWKLVZLOOEH
a topic at the project review next Monday. 
Lead Product Engineer 
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The email was ZULWWHQLQUHVSRQVHWRDQHDUOLHUPHVVDJHE\WKHVLWH¶V3ULQFLSDO6XSSOLHU(QJLQHHU
which included data about localised rework on the servers¶ board assemblies at the site. The Lead 
(QJLQHHU¶Vemail was addressed to the Transfer Project Operations Team and subsequently forwarded 
to WKH³)DLOXUH,V1RW$Q2SWLRQ´),1$2Management alias list. The FINAO team, at the time, was 
involved in key decisions regarding which aspects of server production had to be harmonized across 
the different production sites. As the name indicates, the team had a mandate to ensure that the 
production process and its key outputs (computer servers) were reliably similar across sites. Such 
coordination was required to ensure that products coming out of different factories around the world 
would meet the same cost, performance, quality, lead-time and reliability specifications. This, in turn, 
involved selecting which processes, tools, materials and organizations had to be aligned across 
locations and which could be allowed to differ. The rework and repair process was one of those key 
areas which, at the time, were under scrutiny.  
 
The FINAO Team, perhaps unsurprisingly given its mandate, responded promptly to this call which 
was highlighting a potential loss of reliability in the rework area. The FINAO alias list included the 
first author, who at the time was a resident researcher monitoring the transfer project. In response to 
the email, the Team began to pull rework/failure data out of the Quality function. Data appeared to 
suggest that there was ³>«@a [statistically significant] population of boards that keeps coming back 
IURPWKHYHQGRUDQGGRHVQRWJHWUHSDLUHG´4XDOLW\'LUHFWRU¶V email).  
 
At the same time, the Lead Engineer began to gather data from his production site to support his 
hypothesis. Data here showed WKDW³>«] the production line in [his manufacturing site] is moving 
toward in-KRXVHUHZRUNUDWKHUWKDQDZD\IURPLW´ (Lead Engineer¶V email). At the FINAO meeting, 
the following Monday, it was agreed that there was sufficient evidence of potential reliability losses to 
assign a budget and a task team and begin an investigation aimed at uncovering and rectifying the 
potential reliability issues. Our researcher decided at that point that the topic was sufficiently relevant 
to the purpose of her study to dedicate part of her time to monitor closely the efforts of the 
investigation team. In a short time frame, therefore, an entirely new network had been mobilized. This 
network was built around the notion of reliability and would soon present a serious challenge to 
modularity rules and their network.  
Stage 2 - The investigation: Reliability gains strength 
The investigation analyzed the rework process in the greatest detail and produced a report 
summarising the outcomes. Findings confirmed that, within the rework cycle, there were instances 
where the integrity of information and data flows broke down. This carried significant implications 
for problem-solving and learning processes, as it created opportunities for faults within the boards to 
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escape detection. In the following section we consider in detail the main issues at play within the 
rework cycle as exposed by the investigation.  
The board¶s loss of history and identity 
One of the LQYHVWLJDWLRQ¶Vkey findings highlighted an issue with how the boards¶ identities were 
managed. When a board undergoing testing at the integrator was found to be faulty, it was taken out 
of the production sequence and sent back to the supplier for repair. There it was repaired, re-serialised 
and eventually sent back to the integrator as a fresh new board. The term µfresh¶ indicated that the 
board was considered µDVQHZ¶DVit had never been faulty. The rationale behind the re-serialization 
was the systems integrator¶V need to avoid the overheads involved in retainLQJDERDUG¶s history. This 
was supported by the Materials function³If >«@we find that the material [is] defective, then the 
expectation would be that we return that material to the supplier´Head of Materials).  
 
This logic, however, was not without implications. The board¶V new identity, its new serial number, 
would later prevent recalling its failure history, including all the data pertaining to failures and 
subsequent repairs. The re-serialisation also meant that, in absence of failure history, the integrator 
would be unable to learn from its own mistakes RUWKHVXSSOLHU¶V. By re-serializing and treating the 
modules as fully interchangeable despite previous failures, the integrator was favoring ³VZDSSLQJ´ 
over ³IL[ing´. This, in turn, generated an error of the fixing kind: the loss of failure and repair history. 
³=HUR,QYHQWRU\´V\VWHPDQG³$XWRVZDS´ 
Another key aspect of the investigation concerned the Autoswap process, a formal procedure 
associated with the efficiency-bearing principles of lean inventory systePV³/HDQ3URGXFWLRQ´DQG
³-XVW-In-7LPH´7KHVHHVWDEOLVKHGPDQDJHPHQWSUDFWLFHVDUHNQRZQPeans of reducing the costs and 
risks associated with holding large stocks of inventory (Adler et al., 1999), costs which can be 
extremely high in the electronics sector. To reduce its costs, our integrator strived to hold the lowest 
SRVVLEOHVWRFNVRILQYHQWRU\DGHYLFHDOVRNQRZQDV³]HURLQYHQWRU\´ 
 
Following this philosophy, our organization had set up a streamlined Inventory Control System 
managed through Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software and Oracle StarBase, a database used 
to control materials and transactions at each stage of the inventory lifecycle. The software-embedded 
planning system required that every time a faulty board was returned to the vendor for repair, this 
would immediately issue a new board and ship it to the integrator. This process was known as 
µ$XWRVZDS¶through the automatic swap of a faulty board for a new one, the levels of inventory at the 
integrator always remained constant. This eliminated the need for counting boards, and therefore 
greatly reduced inventory carrying costs: 
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Autoswap is an Inventory Management System: I give you a board, you give me a board, I still have 
WKHVDPHQXPEHURIERDUGVLQP\LQYHQWRU\$QG\RXGRQ¶WKDYHWRVD\µ,DPJLYLQJ\RXDERDUGEDFN
now I have to decrement P\LQYHQWRU\¶XQWLOLWJHWVEDFNWRPHDQGWKHQ,SXWLWEDFNDJDLQ>«@
Autoswap saves a lot of internal transactions, it is like balancing your cheque book: do I have to trace 
every penny that went in so that it gets back to me or do I just say in the end I have got the right 
amount of dollars (Product Engineer).  
Their quest for efficiency and leanness was also reflected in the configuration of the software itself. 
While some aspects of inventory control such as Master Scheduling (planning for the acquisition of 
production materials) were supported through the purchase of dedicated ERP software modules, 
others, including Cycle Counting (techniques for organizing physical counting), were not.  
>«@\RX¶OOILQGWKDWGHSHQGLQJRQZKLFKGHSDUWPHQW\RXDUHLQ\RXPD\EHOXFN\DQGKDYHDPRGHUQ
ERP module or you can be frustrated because your particular field of interest is not really seen as the 
core work. And the core work on the ERP side of things is in terms of MRP, Materials Planning, 
Master Scheduling, etc. >«@QRWWKHLQYHQWRU\(Inventory Controller). 
Our Inventory Controller, whose mandate involved preserving inventory accuracy and integrity, did 
not share the OHDQµ]HURLQYHQWRU\¶ philosophy embedded in the inventory system (reducing counting 
overheads). He argued instead for a more sophisticated system that would allow tracking and counting 
PDWHULDOV&RXQWLQJKRZHYHUZDVHQWLUHO\DJDLQVWWKHDXWRPDWLFVZDSSLQJV\VWHP¶VOHDQSKLORVRSK\
and thus was not supported. While therefore greater quality control could have been achieved by 
acquiring further software capability enabling the counting, these resources were not made available.  
Resources were instead FOHDUO\DOLJQHGZLWKWKH³$XWRVZDS´PHthodology, as reflected in the choice 
of software modulesDQGFOHDUO\IDYRUHG³VZDSSLQJ´QRWFRXQWLQJERDUGVRYHU³IL[LQJ´NHHSLQJ
WUDFNRIIDLOHGERDUGV7KLVLQGLFDWHGWKDWWKH³VZDSSLQJ´LPSHUDWLYHWKLVWLPHFRPELQHGZLWKDµlean 
production¶ efficiency-bearing rationale, was prevailing within the Inventory aspect of the rework. An 
HPSKDVLVRQ³VZDSSLQJ´, the automatic exchange of boards with the vendor, in turn implied a fixing 
type of error: not counting meant that they were not tracking boards, again leading to the loss of repair 
history. The organization as a result was extremely lean and run very efficiently, but potentially at the 
expense of quality and reliability.  
Ownership and responsibility   
A further issue found by the investigation was WKHLQWHJUDWRU¶VLQDELOLW\± and, perhaps most 
importantly, unwillingness - to track boards that it did QRWµRZQ¶. When our integrator returned a 
board to the supplier, it fully relinquished ownership of the component, thus entirely avoiding taking 
responsibility for its repair, and being held accountable for the damage. This, however, implied a loss 
of access to crucial repair-related information which remained with the supplier. Combined with the 
absence of any links between the systems integrator and the supplier¶VGDWDEDses, this meant that it 
was impossible for the integrator to keep track of what happened to a board once it left its premises.  
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As practitioners set out to explore possible ways to solve this problem, they faced a number of 
obstacles. It was clear that the problem could not have been fixed, for example, by simply improving 
information sharing across the supplier/producer boundary. Both supplier and integrator were in fact 
against the prospect of sharing any confidential and proprietary data as they saw each other as 
potential direct competitors. Another possibility would have been to invest in component-tagging 
technology (radio frequency identification, or RFID), for which the integrator is a world-leading 
producer. This strategy, KRZHYHUZRXOGKDYHJRQHHQWLUHO\DJDLQVWWKH³VZDSSLQJ´ philosophy, which 
was about not having to count and track boards. The rationale was that the savings procured by RFID 
would have been offset by even greater inventory and infrastructure costs.  
 
There was yet another reason, however, behind the integrator¶VUHOXFWDQFHto own damaged boards. 
Tracking and tracing would have forced our firm to take responsibility for damaged boards, thus 
removing one of the main potential benefits of modularity and outsourcing. Tagging would have 
caused the integrator to incur the costs for repairing all the boards that it damaged, rather than simply 
returning them WRWKHVXSSOLHU³>«@ZLWK$XWRVZDSZHGRQ¶WKDYHWRWUDFNE\VHULDOQXPEHUZKHUH
did it go, and if a board gets scratched or damaged [here] WKHYHQGRUEX\VWKDWERDUGDQGZHGRQ¶W
HYHUKDYHWRVHHLWDJDLQ´Product Engineer).  
 
Once again, they were ³VZDSSLQJ´ZKLOHUHOHJDWLQJ³IL[LQJ´WRWKHEDFNVWDJH. Swapping allowed the 
integrator greater flexibility in switching both components and their suppliers. This was based on 
establishing DQDUP¶VOHQJWKUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKVXSSOLHUs, supported by a clear division of ownership 
and responsibility. Advanced IT-based technologies such as RFID, which could have supported 
component traceability, were thus not invoked as they were against WKHPDLQ³VZDSSLQJ´philosophy. 
A fixing-type error was generated also in this case: WKHLUHPSKDVLVRQ³shiftLQJ´ the problem to the 
supplier LQVWHDGRI³IL[LQJ´FRPELQHGwith their unwillingness to track what happened afterwards, 
meant that they also lost access to crucial repair-related information. The contradiction was that, 
whereas their intention was WR³ORVH´ the failed board, they were instead very likely to see it again, 
only in the different, unrecognisable guise of a fresh, re-serialised board. 
Asymmetries: system vs. component view 
Another key finding of the investigation concerned the way competences were divided across the 
supplier/integrator boundary. The combination of modular and outsourcing strategies in fact implied a 
clean cut division of labour and competences. This generated strong knowledge, views and 
capabilities asymmetries between producer and supplier (Simon, 1996; Marengo et al., 2005; Brusoni 
et al., 2001). These were clearly apparent in the area of testing.  
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While in fact the integrator held both component and system testing capabilities, the supplier was only 
proficient at basic component testing. The supplier was therefore often unable to detect - and thus 
repair ± any faults caused by the systemic interactions between the board and other components. 
$FFRUGLQJWRD3URGXFW(QJLQHHU³>@%HFDXVHRIWKHZD\ZHGHVLJQHGRXUWHVWSURFHVVWKHH[WHUQDO
manufacturer is not able to catch perforPDQFHSUREOHPV>«@:HGLGQ¶WJLYHWKHPWKHH[WHQVLYHNLQGV
RIWHVWLQJDQGWKHH[SHQVLYHHTXLSPHQWLQRUGHUWRGRWKHIXQFWLRQDOOHYHOWHVWLQJ>«@7KDWLVDFWXDOO\
OHIWKHUH´At the system integrator, 
WHUXQµH[HUFLVHUV¶NLQGRIWHVWV6RZHSXWDERDUGinto a system and we run tests on that. We also 
UXQ>«@GLDJQRVWLF>«@DQGPHPRUy tests of different sorts. The requirement for most of those tests 
is that you actually have a running system, you have enough hardware around there to really start up 
a system under Unix and, >«@LQRUGHUWRGRWKDW, \RXQHHGDµKRWPDUN-XS¶6R\RXQHHGDWHVWEHG
that has all the different pieces of the system in order to put the board in and make it run. (ibid) 
 
This indicated that the level of system testing capability at the supplier was low, an asymmetry that 
could have been tackled by sharing the system testing capabilities with the external manufacturers: 
³>6XSSOLHUV@DUHPRYLQJLQWRPRUHDQGPRUHWHVWLQJEXW>«@WRGRWKHNLQGRIIXQFWLRQDOOHYHOWHVWLQJ
that we do you have to know a lot about the system: how [it] was designed, what the architecture is, 
and all the intricacies and details behind it´ (Lead Product Engineer).The systems integration testing, 
instead, is a core capability for the integrator: 
6RLW¶VDNLQGRIVWUDWHJLFDGYDQWDJHVWUDWHJLFFDSDELOLW\WKDWZHKDYH>«@WKHVHKLJKHQGV\VWHPV
this is our bread and butter, this is where our technical strength is, so we want to make sure that they 
DUHWHVWHGZHOOHYHU\WKLQJZRUNVDQGDOOWKDW>«@$VVHPEO\Ls not where the value added is for us: 
LW¶VWKHLQWHJUDWLRQRIWKHV\VWHP6R>LW¶VDERXW@WKHV\VWHPOHYHOWHVWLQJDQGWKHWHVWLQJRIWKHVXE
parts and making that into a working system and making sure that all those things do work together, 
that you find as many problems as you can. [Besides,] we designed it and it is one of our 
competences right now [ibid, emphasis in the original].  
 
Establishing a clear separation between system and component testing, one of the main consequences 
of adopting a modular strategy, meant that integrator and supplier had very different views of 
debugging and failure: one a system-based view, and the other a component-based view. The 
asymmetry in their views and cognitive frames (March and Simon, 1958; Boland and Tenkasi, 1995; 
Weick, 1979), knowledge and capabilities (Simon, 1996; Marengo et al., 2005), and access to tools 
and technologies (Callon and Caliskan, 2010) was reflected in a strong bias in the way they were able 
to interpret and resolve hardware-related failures. The supplier, having no system testing tools, was 
unable to judge whether a board was faulty, as they had no means to test the component within the 
system. The integrator, by contrast, was able to detect system failures and establish whether and how 
a board was defective. Again, by not giving the suppliers system testing capabilities they were 
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IDYRULQJ³VZDSSLQJ´DFOHDUGLYLVLRQRINQRZOHGJHDFURVVWKHVXSSOLHULQWHJUDWRUERXQGDU\RYHU
³IL[LQJ´DQGWKH\REWDLQHGDIL[LQJNLQGRIHUURUVXSSOLHUVZHUHunable to detect systemic failures. 
Testing procedures, rules and heuristic 
The investigation also found that both formal rules/procedures and informal heuristics were 
consistently VXSSRUWLQJ³VZDSSLQJ´RYHU³IL[LQJ´7KLVEHFDPe apparent when observing everyday 
practices on the shop floor. With regard to standard procedures, as one would expect from an 
RUJDQL]DWLRQIXOO\FRPPLWWHGWRDPRGXODUVWUDWHJ\WHFKQLFLDQVZHUHWDXJKWWR³VZDS´VZLWFKDQG
return a failed board to the supplier) rather than attempting to fix. Responsibility for component 
failure lay HQWLUHO\ZLWKWKHVXSSOLHUDQGWKLVZDVUHIOHFWHGLQWKHVKRSIORRUWHFKQLFLDQV¶ORZVNLOO
profile. Test techs were instructed not to attempt to fix a board as this would only risk damaging it 
further, thus shifting the responsibility/cost of repair to the integrator. 
 
Even when choosing to bypass formal procedures in favor of informal practices, however, our 
technicians were sWLOO³VZDSSLQJ´QRW³IL[LQJ´7echnicians, for example, frequently worked around 
formal procedures by referring to known local trial and error heuristics based on their tacit knowledge 
(Narduzzo et al., 2000). An experienced technician presented with a failure would in fact often have a 
feel for which component had a higher likelihood to be the cause. This for example could be a hunch 
EDVHGRQNQRZOHGJHRIWKHFRPSRQHQWWKDWPRVWIUHTXHQWO\IDLOHG$WRWKHUWLPHVWKHVHUYHU¶VFRUUHFW
functioning could be assessed by touching the machine to judge its temperature or listening closely to 
HQVXUHWKDWLWVKXPZDVFRQVLVWHQWZLWK³WKHVRXQGRIDZHOO-WXQHGPDFKLQH´VKRSIORRUWHFKQLFLDQ
Once identified the component suspected of causing the failure, the technician would proceed to 
extract and reject the presumed faulty component without making any further enquiries, and then 
swap the failed component for a new one. The sequence would be completed by re-testing the system 
to confirm that the cause of the problem had actually been eliminated.  
 
While effective, however, this heuristic did not allow the test tech to establish the actual cause of 
IDLOXUH$FFRUGLQJWRDQ(QJLQHHU)DLOXUH$QDO\VWV)$³«GRQRWKDYHDGHILQLWLYHGLDJQRVLVRID
failing board and they make an educated guess [as to] where the SUREOHPOLHV´/HDG(QJLQHHU
emphasis added,WIROORZVWKDWWKH)$FDQQRWEHVXUHZKHWKHUWKHGLDJQRVLVLVFRUUHFW³The 
feedback on whether [the VROXWLRQ@IL[HVWKHSUREOHPLVQRWYHU\JRRGDWWKLVSRLQW´LELG 
This had never been an issue in the past whence failed boards were moved to the nearby FA area 
where they were diagnosed and fixed, and eventually scanned back into the production line. As a 
consequence of outsourcing repair to the supplier, however, the opportunity to pinpoint the exact 
cause RIIDLOXUHKDGEHHQORVW7KHERDUGZDVUHWXUQHGWRWKHVXSSOLHUZLWKRQO\³>«@DQLQGLFDWLRQDV
WRZKHUHWKHSUREOHPOLHV´/HDG(QJLQHHU, thus shifting the responsibility for finding the fault to the 
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supplier. As the vendor did not have system test capabilities, however, they were often unable to find 
the fault.  
With Autoswap, the [faulty] board goes to the vendor, there [it] is not repaired (the vendor does not have 
the system level test capability that we have in the factory) and then the board is returned [to us] in 
SURGXFWLRQLQWKHIORZRIQHZERDUGVDQGRIWHQVKRZVXSDVµ1HZ-To-)DLO¶LELG 
As the integrator did not know that the board had previously failed and subsequently undergone 
UHSDLU³7KHERDUG>GLG@ not go back to FA for failure validation before being inserted into the 
production process (ibid, emphasis added7KHFRQVHTXHQFHZDVWKDW³%RDUGVFRXOGHQGXSLQDORRS
with the FA for difficult-to-diagnose boards because the tech could repeatedly choose the same 
FRPSRQHQWIRUUHSODFHPHQWEHFDXVHLWKDVWKHKLJKHVWSUREDELOLW\RIIDLOXUH´/HDUQLQJ, both at the 
level of the individual expert and the organization, was severely hindered as failure data could not be 
XVHGWRLQIRUPWKHWHFK¶VIXWXUHLQWHUDFWLRQVZLWKWKDWSDUWLFXODUERDUG Once again, practitioners 
favoUHG³VZDSSLQJ´VZLWFKLQJDQGshifting fault-finding to the supplier) and the result was a fixing 
kind of error: uncertainty about the actual cause of failure. 
Interfaces, systemic interactions and performance 
The last key finding of the investigation raised questions about the role of complexity and uncertainty 
in debugging complex, fully modular server products. Practitioners at the integrator, as explained 
earlier, were aware of the modularity principles and the organization itself could be described as 
striving towards full modularity as a goal. Their ambition was a Lego-like situation where they would 
EHDEOHWRVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGO\VZLWFKDQGUHWXUQFRPSRQHQWVWRWKHVXSSOLHU³VZDSSLQJ´ZLWKRXW
having to fix. As a result of their faith in modularity, our practitioners believed that the clear 
decoupling of modules within a system should have eliminated the need for system level testing.  
 
Despite the fact that our organization presented a highly codified and standardized environment, 
however, the hardware debugging process was hampered by high levels of uncertainty and ambiguity. 
In high-end electronics, the fast pace of innovation combined with frequent imbalances between 
innovation at the component and system level (Brusoni et al., 2001) meant that problem solving 
processes such as bug fixing were often only imperfectly decoupled (Marengo et al., 2005). A 
particularly reflective practitioner raised this issue by voicing the opinion that, in high-end electronics, 
full modularity was more of an ideal that firms aspired to: 
>«@WKHUHLVDQRWher issue right now, between having fully tested sub-components that you can µmix 
and match¶ and put together vs. do we need to test something as a matching set. There is something 
with the way boards interact that we have to test them, you know, actually set up the material together 
WRPDNHVXUHWKDWLWZRUNVWRJHWKHUDQGWKHQQRWFKDQJHDQ\WKLQJ>«@We would like to get to a 
commodity level ZKHUHZHFRXOGMXVWLQWHUFKDQJHWKLQJVZLWKRXWDQ\ZRUU\EXWWKDW¶VQRWH[DFWO\
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where we are yet >«@If I know that it has been tested, it always works (Lead Engineer, emphasis 
added). 
In acknowledging these drawbacks our Engineer demonstrated an awareness of the potential 
limitations of the mainstream modularity paradigm being performed. However, even in his 
sophisticated vision, he too saw their current situation as a temporary, intermediate step in the path 
towards full modularity, or the day where they would be able to simply swap, without worrying about 
fixing (system testing). In the meantime, system-level testing provided the means to detect faulty 
modules which could then be swapped out in exchange for a new module. In other words they were 
³IL[LQJ´SHUIRUPLQJV\VWHP-level testing which in principle should be redundant in fully modularised 
systems), despite their enduring belief in the power of swapping, and a swapping-kind of error was 
generated: boards could not be exchanged unproblematically. 
Outcome of the investigation: Vicious Cycle of Failures 
The investigation conducted on the rework and repair cycle thus produced an unexpected outcome: 
defective boards continued circulating without getting fixed (Figure 1b).  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1b about here 
---------------------------------- 
Once a (still defective) board arrived at the integrator re-labelled as a new board, shop floor 
practitioners were unable to recall that the board had previously failed. Because the new identity 
provided a clean slate, the board was not put through Failure Analysis (where repaired boards should 
have undergone system level testing for verification), but was instead put once again through 
production as a new board. Here, the still defective board would almost certainly produce a new fail. 
Because the board remained the component most likely to have caused the failure, this was once again 
chosen as candidate for replacement and sent back to the supplier for repair. There it was not repaired, 
as the supplier did not have system testing capabilities. System level faults did not show up in the 
supplLHU¶VWHVWVDQGFRQVHTXHQWO\GLGQRWJHWIL[HG7KHERDUGZDs re-serialised and returned 
unrepaired to the integrator only to fail again.  
 
These dynamics resulted in a vicious failure cycle of undetected faults and potentially repeated 
failures: test techs at the integrator did not know what they were swapping, the supplier did not know 
what they were fixing, the integrator did not know whether the board that arrived from the supplier 
was new, or, if it was a repaired board, whether it had been actually fixed. A defective loop was 
generated, whereby boards kept coming back and forth between the integrator and component 
supplier but remained unrepaired. In the previous context where debugging was performed in-house, 
this problem had been prevented by an easy and quick route from the production line to the nearby FA 
area where the board would get repaired and re-tested (Figure 1a). The investigation concluded that an 
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element of unpredictability and a source of error had been created as a consequence of bug-fixing 
having become decoupled across the integrator/supplier boundary.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1a about here 
----------------------------------- 
Stage 3 ± Modularity persists but modified 
As highlighted by the investigation, modularity theory, and its key rules and assumptions, were being 
performed fiercely in almost every aspect of the rework cycle where modularity rules had been able to 
prevail practically unchallenged. The errors brought up by the investigation, however, were about to 
produce some dramatic changes. The evidence of potential reliability and quality losses was promptly 
enrolled by those supporting reliability, whose side began to gain traction. From a reliability 
viewpoint, it was becoming increasingly clear that modularity and complementary rules had made the 
organization so efficient that it had become too lean to learn, both from LWVRZQDQGWKHVXSSOLHU¶V
errors.   
 
Following the investigation, a new network supporting the reliability argument thus began to emerge. 
New statistics began to surface that challenged practitioners to reflect on the consequences of 
undetected failures in production and in the field. Failure information that had once been ignored 
began to be foregrounded. People in corridors debated the pros and cons of letting errors proliferate 
uncorrected. Meetings were called which provided opportunities to discuss the possible implications 
of bringing rework back in-house. At the same time, arguments were being advanced from the 
modularity side of the debate warning that re-internalizing rework would imply incurring the costs 
and responsibility of repairing boards which they themselves had not broken, costs which would have 
normally been incurred by the supplier. These drawbacks, however, appeared less significant 
FRPSDUHGWRWKHORVVRIUHSXWDWLRQEURXJKWDERXWE\HUURUVRIWKHµIL[LQJ¶NLQGZKLFKFRXOGSRWHQWLDOO\
result in substantial outages in the field.  
 
An instance of reliability loss was highlighted during the course of a heated debate around an 
extended server outage incident which had recently occurred at a Japanese customer running mission-
critical manufactuULQJRSHUDWLRQV7KHRXWDJHZKLFKKDGFDXVHGH[WUHPHGLVUXSWLRQWRWKHFXVWRPHU¶V
time-sensitive shop floor operations, had clearly exposed the risks of server quality and reliability 
loss. Server failure, in this case, had not only implied unacceptable consequences for the customer 
itself, which on the basis of that single episode was threatening to rescind the contract, but also for our 
organization which, following the incident, was facing a significant loss of reputation. During the 
course of this debate the reliability and modularity coalitions came to confront one another. The 
reliability side used the example of the outage to support the argument that errors of the kind 
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highlighted by the Japanese incident could not be tolerated. The modularity side, instead, tried to 
dismiss the incident as minor and the customer as unreasonably demanding. The threats and dangers 
highlighted by the outage episode, however, were very real and therefore not so easy to downplay. 
This realization caused some practitioners to change sides during the debate, moving across from the 
modularity to the reliability supporting coalition and thus fomenting the growing momentum in favor 
of reliability.  
 
The Japanese customer incident, and the related discussions highlighting instances of reliability loss 
in the server domain, produced therefore the effect of strengthening the outcome of the investigation, 
thus providing further ammunition for the proponents of reliability who were able to canvass 
increasing support for their arguments. Once appropriated by a network that was rapidly growing in 
power and recognition, the evidence of actual and potential server failures uncovered by the 
investigation and related incidents such as the Japanese outage, could therefore no longer be easily 
dismissed and called for a solution to be reached concerning the extent of integration in the area of 
rework. The solution that was reached took the form of a compromise among different views and 
errors and resulted in re-internalizing a limited portion of the rework, pertaining to some of the most 
common failure causes for that particular board type (Figure 1a). This solution, which reflected a 
partial victory for reliability, was supported despite implications for cost (the need to take 
responsibility for boards damaged on the premises), skills (the requirement to retrain technicians to 
undertake rework), technical implications (the need to re-acquire tools necessary to perform repair in-
house), and despite the fact that this component was classified as critical, but ultimately non-core. 
 
Yet, the solution did not imply that they were ready to simply abandon modularity. While reliability 
posed a strong challenge, modularity rules had been successfully entangled with practically every 
aspect of the rework cycle. They were embedded and enacted in the design of the product and the 
interfaces, in the software tools and methodologies used to manage inventories, in key aspects of the 
relationship between integrator and supplier, in the distribution of repair competences and skills, in 
the philosophy that avoided trust and relinquished control, and finally in both formal and informal 
shop-floor procedures. All these aspects added to the strength of modularity rules and meant that they 
were hard to overturn. For example, artifacts like the Oracle database or Autoswap, which was the 
PDWHULDOHPERGLPHQWRIWKH³VZDSSLQJ´LPSHUDWLYHZHUHGLIILFXOWWRZRUNDURXQG(YHQWKRVH
practitioners who had hinted at possible limitations in performing the ideal modular organization, 
including the Engineer who circulated the unintentionally incendiary email that set off the 
investigation, interpreted this just as a temporary setback in the path towards full modularity. 
 
 The decision to bring some of the rework back in-house, therefore, must be seen in the light of the 
predominance of modularity and its rules. The compromise solution did not in fact invalidate the 
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theory. Rather, this temporary and partial remedy allowed modularity to continue to be performed 
(embodied, embedded and enacted) in almost every aspect of the rework process, although in a 
VOLJKWO\PRGLILHGOHVVSHUIHFWO\GHFRXSOHGIRUP'HVSLWHWKHVHSUREOHPVWKHSUDFWLWLRQHUV¶EHOLHILQ
the power of modularity remained very much alive. 
 
Discussion 
Drawing on our rich data set, we can now proceed to introduce our theoretical framework which will 
unravel the dynamics through which modularity was performed within and beyond the context of the 
rework cycle (Fig. 2). This in turn will shed light on the competition between modularity and 
contrasting theories, and their implications for the mutual shaping of theory and organization. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Our in-depth, longitudinal case study highlighted the coexistence of two main theories attempting to 
configure the rework process and the wider organization: modularity and reliability. The dominant 
theory consisted of modularity and a complementary set of efficiency-bearing rules and tools (Zero 
Inventory and Autoswap). The challenging theory included reliability rules and a complementary set 
of principles (quality). We find that the competition between modularity and reliability in the rework 
context involved three phases: initially, modularity prevailed (rework was outsourced to the supplier); 
then reliability gained strength and clashed with modularity (triggering the investigation); and, finally, 
a compromise was reached between the two theories and associated sets of rules (following which 
rework was brought back in-house). 
 
Modularity framing the Rework process (and ensuing errors) 
As illustrated by the company history, modularity had been reigning almost unchallenged within the 
rework process and the wider organization. The performation of modularity depended upon the 
realization of a specific set of rulesRUµFRQGLWLRQVRIIHOLFLW\¶Austin, 1962; Callon, 2007) which, for 
modularity to have an effect, had to frame the rework process. Modularity rules included product 
design UXOHVZKLFKDUH³>«@SULQFLSOHVWKDWGHILQHKRZDQDUWLIDFWZRUNVZKDWLWGRHVDQGKRZLWLV
PDQXIDFWXUHG´%UXVRQLand Prencipe, 2006: 179) as well as the related organizational principles and 
properties that are required for the rules to be performed. More specifically, modularity rules 
included: the modularization of product and organizational architectures, the codification and 
standardizDWLRQRISURGXFWDQGRUJDQL]DWLRQDOLQWHUIDFHVPDLQWDLQLQJDQDUP¶VOHQJWKUHODWLRQVKLS
with suppliers, and performing a clear division of knowledge, problem-solving and productive labour, 
responsibility and accountability across the supplier/producer boundary (see Table 1).  
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---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
A complementary set of efficiency-bearing rules contributed towards supporting modularity, 
including the principles RIµ/HDQ¶RUµ=HUR,QYHQWRU\¶DQGµ$XWRVZDS¶regulating the automatic 
exchange of boards with the supplier. Throughout most of the company history up until the beginning 
of the observation period (first stage), this complex set of rules appeared to be firmly in place and was 
effectively framing the process. Over time, however, another competing theory, reliability, had begun 
to gain momentum.  
 
In the second stage, modularity began to clash with reliability in the rework process. The reliability 
focus, a consequence of the acquisition of the high-end server product line, had been coexisting for a 
while alongside modularity and its complementary efficiency-bearing strategies. Following the 
economic crisis, however, the increasing pressure towards modularity and leanness at both product 
and organizational levels had led to the outsourcing of rework. Frictions had begun to emerge 
between modularity and reliability, which culminated with an email being circulated, which exposed 
important potential instances of reliability loss. Reliability rules required that faults should be detected 
and traced, errors remedied and failures prevented; boards and all components tracked throughout 
their life-cycle and system level diagnostics performed at the supplier¶s premises; knowledge and 
problem-solving integrated and responsibility and accountability shared with the supplier. A set of 
quality principles complemented the reliability statement, setting the parameters within which the 
boards needed to operate to guarantee acceptable failure rates (see Table 1).  
 
Beyond rules, our data shows the emergence of another category of elementsµerrors¶ (Fig.2). Similar 
to &DOORQ¶VµRYHUIORZLQJ¶, errors followed from the competition between (temporarily) 
conflicting theories, modularity and reliability, as a consequence of their joint attempts to frame the 
rework process. Thus, in the first stage, those actors supporting reliability had drawn on a range of 
failure statistics and charts to expose how performing modularity was generating erURUVRIWKH³IL[LQJ´
kind (boards circulating and not getting fixed). In the second stage, modularity supporters had instead 
highlighted the possibility that performing reliability might produce ³VZDSSLQJ´HUURUV (the integrator 
would pay for fixing boards that it had not broken). Errors were therefore enrolled in the 
confrontations between modularity and reliability and helped shape the discussion.  
 
Practitioners soon found themselves negotiating between different theories (modularity or reliability) 
and their (actual or potential) errors. For example, fixing errors were promptly enrolled as evidence of 
the drawbacks of modularity by actors supporting reliability and were used to strengthen their claims 
against the prevailing theory. Negotiations led to a compromise in the third stage, where modularity 
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prevailed but was modified. Reliability, nevertheless, had at least partially succeeded in highlighting 
and problematizing the errors created by modularity, to the extent that practitioners decided to take 
action. The decision to change the organizational boundaries to re-insource aspects of rework 
represented a partial victory for reliability (partial because the fix ultimately meant that modularity 
continued to dominate in all other aspects of the rework process). 
 
Performative struggles and materiality 
An important related point is that modularity and reliability rules (and their errors) were able to frame 
and reframe the rework process by involving a heterogeneous set of material elements (Callon and 
Caliskan, 2010). Modularity rules, for example, which supported ³VZDSSLQJ´ (switching and returning 
a faulty board to the supplier), were embedded in different aspects of the rework process, including 
tools and technologies (such as the Autoswap system and the Oracle database which together turned 
the swapping of faulty modules into the default option); were enacted through the participants 
physical bodies and ostensive understandings of the rework process and its purpose LHµDVZDSSLQJ
URXWLQH¶; and they were performed through formal procedures and informal heuristics (as in the 
methodology used by shop floor technicians for diagnosing failed boards). Reliability rules, instead, 
which supported ³IL[LQJ´ (switching and repairing a failed board in-house), despite being embodied in 
VRPHRIWKHDFWRUV¶DEVWUDFWRVWHQVLYHXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIWKHSURFHVVLHDµIL[LQJURXWLQH¶did not 
succeed in enrolling the ERP cycle counting module and RFID technology which would have 
supported counting and the automatic tracking and tracing of boards across the supplier/integrator 
boundary and along the rework cycle. The extent to which practitioners were able to mobilize social 
and material features in support of one theory over another helps explain how a theory might begin to 
dominate in an organization and the consequences for its practices and boundaries. 
 
The battle between contrasting theories can therefore be understood as the confrontation between 
multiple competing ordering systems (the theories, their rules and the array of sociomaterial elements 
that support them). Sometimes the ordering systems underpinning a theory, corresponding to different 
µlogics¶(Purdy and Gray, 2009; Greenwood et al., 2011), interpretations, or understandings of the 
process (Dougherty, 1992; Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2004) plus the sociomaterial infrastructures that 
support them (RUµlogistics¶), may overlap substantially (Berg and Timmermans, 2000). Yet at other 
times, as our case illustrates, they may be opposing each other to a greater extent. The outcome, in 
this case, was DQ³DPDOJDPRIORJLFV´LELG 43) as exemplified by the compromise between a 
³VZDSSLQJ´DQGD³IL[LQJ´ORJLF, and the related ostensive understandings of the rework routine, 
eventually reached in the rework area.  
 
What did this compromise look like and how did it configure the rework process? While modularity, 
by embedding itself in most aspects of the rework process, had prevailed over reliability and retained 
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its dominant position in the rework process, it was clear that the latter had managed to secure at least 
one crucial victory. TKHKLGGHQµIL[LQJHUURUV¶ that had been highlighted by the performative struggle 
against reliability, embedded in the material form of failure stats and charts used as the basis for 
negotiations, had been acknowledged and addressed by bringing rework back in-house. This brought 
renewed (albeit temporary) stability to the process, as reflected in a renewed balance of power 
between the two competing theories. 0RGXODULW\¶VPDLQUDWLRQDOH³VZDSSLQJ´was therefore able to 
continue to thrive, not despite, but because it could draw upon its errors ³IL[LQJ´ 
 
 
 
Organization modifies the theory 
Performative struggles therefore resulted in changes to the organization which became more closely-
coupled than the modularity¶V abstract ideal of a µperfect integrator¶ - which our practitioners were 
pursuing - would have allowed. The outcome of the competition between two theories in the context 
of the rework process however also implied that modularity itself was modified as a result of the 
performative struggle against reliability. This particular instance of performation of the theory had 
challenged - and at least marginally deflated - WKHFRPSDQ\¶VXQZDYHULQJIDLWKLQWKHSRZHURI
modularity. Or, perhaps more precisely, it had suggested that a more sophisticated temporary truce 
was required at this point in time, in this particular organization, between efficiency- and reliability-
bearing strategies, two important (usually complementary, but in this particular case temporarily 
conflicting) sides of the lean production philosophy (Womack and Jones, 1996). As a consequence, 
modularity was therefore still being performed, albeit to a lesser extent. The performative struggles 
between modularity and reliability over time and in the context of this organization had eventually 
resulted in the modification of the theory itself.   
Conclusions 
In this paper we have considered the effect of organizational theories on the organization by focusing 
on how modularity, a widespread and influential organizational theory, was able to shape the 
organization, and how it was shaped in return. We have done so by focusing on how modularity and 
associated rules were performed, over time and in the context of a contemporary pioneering high-
technology organization, whose history and successes have been closely tied to those of modularity 
itself. Through a high level of field access which has allowed us to follow the changes occurring to 
the rework process in detail and over time, we were able to gain valuable new insights into the co-
production of theory and organization.  
 
Drawing on the performativity thesis this paper thus contributes to studies of modularity through a 
theoretical framework which captures how modularity is performed in context and over time. Our 
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framework helps us theorize how the modular organization emerges as the outcome of performative 
struggles among competing theories (modularity and reliability) and their rules, and how these 
sociomaterial struggles and the ensuing errors modify the theory and shape the practices and 
boundaries of the organization. In so doing, we also add to performativity-inspired approaches in 
economic sociology, the sociology of finance and organizational theory, which have thus far mainly 
focused on the influence of individual theories, by theorising the competitions between multiple 
theories, their outcomes, and the implications for organizational practices and boundaries. We 
conclude by highlighting three core findings that provide the basis for a performative study of 
modularity and wider organizational theories. 
Theories (and their errors) perform organizations 
The first key contribution resulting from studying modularity from a performative perspective is a 
theoretical framework which captures the more complex, dynamic and nuanced effects of modularity 
rules on the organization. As our evidence shows, while modularity rules can indeed be fully 
prescriptive or merely descriptive, they are often performed by actors to different levels and with 
varying outcomes. We therefore add to those contributions in the modularity literature which have 
offered opposing arguments for modularity theory ± i.e. that it either succeeds or fails to µGHVLJQ¶ 
(Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001) organizations ± by showing how and how far the theory is enacted and 
shapes the organization, and how it may be shaped in return. In our case, the evidence shows that 
modularity was being performed successfully in most aspects of the rework process. We can therefore 
place the outcome of performing modularity, in the rework context and during the period of 
observation, DWWKHµVWURQJ¶HQGRIWKHSHUIRUPDWLYLW\UDQJH0DF.HQ]LH, 2006; '¶$GGHULR, 2008).  
 
At the same time, however, our evidence also shows that the µtranslation¶ (Callon, 1986) of 
modularity rules into a modular organization was incomplete. In framing the rework process, 
modularity rules had created errors which were promptly enrolled by the competing paradigm, 
reliability, and used to modify both the theory and the organization. The re-internalization of a portion 
of rework, in response to fixing errors, had thus allowed modularity to prevail, albeit in a modified 
form, marginally closer to the integral than the fully decoupled end of the spectrum. µErrors¶ (or, in 
performativity terms, the overflowing) have been a neglected aspect of modularity studies, having 
been implicitly viewed as either the outcome of the theory not being fully or correctly implemented 
into technological and/or organizational interfaces (the mainstream approach); or as the result of the 
failure of the theory itself to account for organizational and technological complexity (the contingency 
approach). Through our performative lens, instead, we were able to theorize the emergence of errors 
not simply as a failure of technology/organization to reproduce the theory or a failure of the theory to 
reflect the complexity of technology/organization but as the continuously emergent outcome of 
performative struggles among competing theories in their context. The emphasis on context has also 
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SURYLGHGLPSRUWDQWLQVLJKWVLQWRWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VDELOLW\RUODFNWKHUHRIWRKDUQHVVRYHUIORZVDQG
use them to reconfigure its boundaries and/or the theory.  
In further theorizing the role of errors, our findings also add to performativity-inspired approaches in 
organizational theory (Cabantous and Gond, 2011), and tKHGLVFXVVLRQRIµRYHUIORZV¶in 
performativity theory (Callon, 1998). In the first case, our results add to the extant theory by showing 
precisely how overflows may (or may not) contribute to constituting and modifying organizations and 
their theories. In the second case, we shed new light over the possible sources of overflows. Whereas 
the extant theory (ibid) has focused on the emergence of overflows as resulting from µLPSHUIHFWLRQV¶
within the frame, we demonstrate that overflows may be at least partially constituted outside the 
frame, from a theory¶VLQWHUDFWLRQV with other theories operating within and beyond the organizational 
context.   
Performative struggles shape organizational boundaries 
Our second core contribution therefore consists in theorizing the coexistence of modularity with 
competing theories, their performative struggles and their implications for the organization and the 
theory. Our in-depth, longitudinal study set in a contemporary high-technology organization exposed 
to multiple organizational and institutional pressures showed how modularity did not operate alone 
but instead coexisted together with other theories which were also attempting to configure the 
organization at the same time. As our evidence illustrates, within organizations and beyond, theories 
rarely exist in isolation.  Rather, organizations are typically configured by multiple ordering systems, 
including a plurality of theories, each with its own rules and assumptions. Some theories may be 
mostly complementary (as, in our case, modularity and zero inventory principles, or reliability and 
quality), whereas others may be largely in conflict (as the efficiency-bearing modularity rules and 
reliability). To complicate the picture, alliances among theories may shift quite significantly both over 
time and in the context where they are enacted.  
 
The presence of competing theories, and their influence over organizational practices and boundaries, 
has been largely neglected within studies of modularity. Building on the case of a diverse and 
distributed organization, and drawing on pHUIRUPDWLYLW\¶VHPSKDVLVRQplurality and multiplicity, we 
were able to add to extant contributions by revealing how different sets of rules do not always merely 
substitute one another, but often become involved in dynamic confrontations. While at times 
confrontations can indeed result in the replacement of one rule, which becomes non-performative, for 
another, which becomes performative (as in Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006), at other times their 
outcomes tend to reflect a synthesis, involving mutual dynamic adaptation under conditions of 
uncertainty. Our results therefore add to the modularity debate by theorizing the dynamics 
underpinning performative struggles (Callon, 2007) and how they shape both theory and organization. 
In addition, as theories evolve through competition, their influence varies over time and across 
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organizations, so that any outcomes can only ever be emergent. It is therefore the dynamic 
competitions among contrasting theories and their networks, which include but span beyond abstract 
rules (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996) and knowledge (Brusoni et al., 2001), which ultimately modify 
theories and µGHVLJQRUJDQL]DWLRQV¶ While adding to modularity, this finding also responds to the 
rHFHQWFDOOIRUVWXG\LQJKRZGLIIHUHQW³>«@WKHRULHVLQWHUDFWDQGLQIOXHQFHRUJDQL]DWLRQDOSUDFWLFHV´
and shape organizational behaviours and outcomes ³>«@WKURXJKSHUIRUPDWLYLW\VWUXJJOHV´
(Cabantous and Gond, 2011: 582). While Callon (2007) has advocated for the need to re-imagine 
organizations and markets as sites for performative struggles, ³>«@Whis perspective has yet to be 
explored´ (Cabantous et al., 2014). But what are the micro-level dynamics which define how theories 
compete? 
 
A related finding is that, to exert its influence, modularity had to build a scaffold, including an array 
of social and material features (similar to Callon¶Vagencement) which supported the realization of its 
rules in practice. Modularity and complementary efficiency rules, for example, were so thoroughly 
embedded in texts, technologies and artifacts that there were serious limitations on how far actors 
FRXOGRSHUDWHµRXWVLGH¶WKHWKHRU\A neglected aspect of current theorizing, capturing the 
sociomaterial aspect of rules performationRU³>«@KRZ>D@WKHRU\LVWUDQVODWHGLQWRWRROVDQGPDWHULDO
GHYLFHV´ (Cabantous and Gond, 2011: 583) thus further adds to current explanations for the success of 
modularity beyond abstract rules and knowledge. A performative framework therefore allows us to 
capture how the practices and boundaries of the modular organization are continuously challenged 
and constantly shift to reflect the particular array of (intra- and inter-organizational, social and 
material) relationships that produces them at any one time and over time. In so doing, our findings 
also add to performativity-inspired approaches to organizational theory (ibid) by capturing how 
various sociomaterial assemblages, supporting different knowledge, rules and assumptions and 
affording different practices or NLQGVRIµFDOFXODWLRQ¶&DOORQDQG0XQLHVD, 2005), may confront one 
another in their effort to support competing theories, often influencing their organizational outcomes. 
Sociomateriality can therefore help us understand how a theory may be able to shape routines, 
practices and boundaries and contribute to µdesigning¶ an organization. Our evidence, in addition, also 
suggests that the organization itself might in return participate in µdesigning¶ the theory. 
The mutual production of theory and organization 
Our final key finding concerns the mutual shaping of theory and organization. Our case study has 
highlighted the subtle ways in which modularity rules might be able to (re)configure the organization, 
its structure, practices and boundaries, while also shedding light over how, in turn, the situated 
enactment of modularity in this particular organization ended up modifying the theory. In the first 
case, concerning the influence of theory over organization, we have seen how the FRPSDQ\¶Vvision of 
modularity as an efficiency-seeking strategy aimed at standardizing and distributing products and 
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organization and therefore supporting superior leanness and cost reduction, conflicted considerably 
with reliability, which instead demanded redundancy and the substantial overlap of production 
knowledge and activities.  
 
In the second case, concerning the influence of the organization over theory, we have instead seen 
that, while modularity did manage to frame the rework process, at the same time it prompted the 
emergence of errors. These were readily enrolled by the competing rationale, reliability, which was 
able to win a marginal victory in the performative struggles between the two theories. This indicates 
that performing modularity had produced an extraordinarily lean and efficient organization, which 
was however brittle and fragile, and therefore prone to failure. The threat of failure, as highlighted and 
problematized by the supporters of the reliability argument, was considered to be such that it induced 
practitioners to revise their vision of modularity. As a consequence of the confrontation with 
reliability, modularity was modified. In capturing and theorizing the mutual shaping of theory and 
organization, this finding adds to both studies of modularity (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Sanchez & 
Mahoney, 1996; Brusoni et al., 2001; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006) and wider approaches concerning 
the performativity of (organizational) theories (Cabantous et al., 2010; Cabantous and Gond, 2011).  
 
Our findings beg a further and final question. Will the lessons from this outstanding organization, 
which had such a deep historical relationship with modularity, also succeed in modifying the wider 
theory, namely the scholarly debate surrounding modularity? While we are unable to predict any 
specific outcomes at this stage, we believe that it will depend upon the willingness of both the 
mainstream and the contingency sides of the modularity debate to engage with our results and novel 
approach which at the same time both reconciles and adds to existing approaches. It would be 
interesting, for example, if this outstanding organization which has initially sparked the academic 
interest towards modularity, would end up once again teaching us scholars some important theoretical 
lessons about the mutual shaping of theories and organizations.  
 
Pushing our insights even further, we can foresee promising grounds for future investigation that may 
emerge from our novel approach. We envisage a new stream of studies investigating how the 
struggles among different (contradictory and complementary) theories or strategies, and their 
associated rules, rationales and logics, may play out and transform different organizational contexts. 
This would add to extant approaches which have focused on how different rationales or logics play 
out ZLWKLQWKHVDPHWKHRU\DVLQ&DEDQWRXVDQG*RQG¶VH[DPSOHRIUDWLRQDOchoice theory). 
Further advances that build on our framework might also include shedding new light over the 
emergence of macro theories and their organizational effects. Among the interesting features 
highlighted by our case evidence and related discussion, for example, is the hypothesis that the 
confrontation between modularity and reliability followed the unexpected emergence of tensions 
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between two different (but usually complementary) sides of Lean Production theory, the µefficiency¶
RUµFRVWUHGXFWLRQ¶ side and the µzero defects¶ side. Taking this insight further would prompt a timely 
investigation into the emergence of Lean Production as a meta-theory, incorporating both efficiency 
and reliability principles, albeit in different proportions. The question to arise then would be whether 
it was the imbalance created in our case by the overemphasis on the efficiency side of lean that 
brought two usually complementary features to clash irremediably. One possible answer, we posit, is 
that incorporating the errors and re-internalizing rework had the effect of temporarily restoring a truce 
between the two sides of this influential management theory, a truce which had been lost following 
the increasing emphasis on efficiency brought about by the electronics sector crisis.  
 
While a comprehensive analysis of this topic lies beyond the scope of this paper, results indicate that 
our analytical framework based on performativity can contribute more generally towards advancing 
our understanding of fundamental aspects of contemporary organizing. In capturing the mutual 
constitution of multiple theories and organization, our approach begins to unravel the micro-level, 
sociomaterial mechanisms through which organizations are able to manage apparently unsolvable 
conflicts, contradictions and paradoxes (Poole and Van de Ven, 1989; Adler et al., 1999; Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004) while dynamically adapting to change. Especially in tough and fast changing 
competitive environments, this crucial ability lies at the very EDVLVRIDQRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VSRWHQWLDOWR
survive and prosper. 
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Figure 1 - Computer board rework and repair process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 ± Theoretical Framework 
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Table 1 Modularity and Reliability Rules (framing) and their Errors (overflowing) 
 
 
 
µ)L[LQJ¶ (performing reliability) vs. µ6ZDSSLQJ¶ (performing modularity) 
 
RESERIALISING/ 
LOSS OF IDENTITY  
Rule 6ZDSSLQJ1RQHHGIRUFRRUGLQDWLRQ0RGXODUV\VWHPVµKLGHLQIRUPDWLRQ¶
EHKLQGVWDQGDUGL]HGLQWHUIDFHVVRWKDWWKHFRPSRQHQW¶VLQWHUQDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFV
can be overlooked (Parnas et al. 1985; Baldwin & Clark, 2001; Sanchez & 
Mahoney 1996; Schilling 2000; Sturgeon 2002; Langlois 2002). 
Error Fixing. Loss of memory, failure history, loss of traceability, no learning 
)L[LQJ !HPSKDVLVRQ³FRQWLQXRXVOHDUQLQJ´:HLFNHWDO 
ZERO INVENTORY/ 
AUTOSWAP 
Rule Swapping. FXOOFRPSRQHQWLQWHUFKDQJHDELOLW\µPL[DQGPDWFK¶ Clear 
standardization and decoupling of components within a system means that 
these can be swapped and substituted straightforwardly (Sanchez & Mahoney 
1996)  
 
No slack, µzero inventory¶(Womack & Jones 1996) 
Error Fixing. No redundancy, combined with swapping means no tracking and 
tracing (Fixing => acknowledging the role of slack, redundancy) (Weick et al. 
1999) 
PROBLEM 
OWNERSHIP/ 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Rule Swapping. No need to take ownership RIUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUIDLOXUH³VKLIWLQJWKH
SUREOHP´ 
Error Fixing. LRVLQJWUDFNRIIDLOXUHVVKLIWLQJWKHSUREOHP)L[LQJ !³RZQLQJWKH
SUREOHP´HPSKDVLVRQ³KHHG´³DWWHQWLRQ´DQG³FDUH´5REHUWV;  Weick 
& Roberts 1993) 
SHARP DIV OF LAB/ 
ASYMMETRIC VIEWS/ 
UNEVEN ACCESS TO 
TOOLS 
Rule Swapping. Sharp division of productive labor (Sanchez & Mahoney 1996).  
Outsourcing allows systems integrator to relinquish ownership and 
responsibility for subcontracted components. Separation of component from 
system testing 
Error Fixing. Unable to fault find (Fixing => coordination thrRXJK³VKDUHG
LGHRORJ\´RU³PLQGVHWV´³FROOHFWLYHPLQGIXOQHVV´:HLFNDWHO; 
Vaughan 1996) 
$50¶6/(1*7+
RELATIONSHIP 
Rule Swapping. Market-OLNHDUP¶VOHQJWKrelationship with suppliers (Langlois 
2002) 
Error Fixing. Not being able to know if the fault has been fixed (Fixing =>  
HPSKDVLVRQFRRUGLQDWLRQFROODERUDWLRQWUXVW³FROOHJLDOLW\´5RXVVHDXHWDO
1998, LaPorte & Consolini 1993), preoccupation with failure (Weick & 
Sutcliffe 2001) 
JUDGEMENT & 
PROBLEM SOLVING 
Rule Swapping. Elimination of uncertainty, ambiguity, judgment in problem-
VROYLQJ$PRGXODURUJDQL]DWLRQLV³>«@RQHLQZKLFKWDVNVDQG
responsibilities are distributed across separate groups/units, which do not 
engage in ongoing, real-WLPHFRPPXQLFDWLRQDQGMRLQWSUREOHPVROYLQJ´
(Carliss Baldwin, personal communication). In fully modular systems, 
interactions among components and overall system behavior entirely 
predictable, process of assembling components into a functioning system 
reduced to simple Lego-like activity. 
Error Fixing. Fragmented problem-solving (Fixing=> joint problem solving by 
teams of experts, reluctance to simplify interpretations, Weick & Sutcliffe 
2001) 
FORMAL & 
INFORMAL RULES, 
PROCEDURES 
Rule Swapping. Clear and sharp division of knowledge and capabilities across the 
integrator/supplier boundaries (Sanchez & Mahoney 1996; Ulrich & Eppinger 
1995). Loosely-coupled modular system (Orton & Weick 1990) no need to 
fault-find (exploitation). Formal and informal procedures support automatic 
switching and shifting responsibility to suppliers 
Error Fixing. UQDEOHWRNQRZIRUFHUWDLQWKHFDXVHRIIDLOXUH)L[LQJ !³]HUR
WROHUDQFH´RQHUURUV)ailure is Not An Option) (exploration) 
SYSTEMIC 
INTERACTIONS 
Rule Fixing. Need for understanding systemic interdependencies, need for systems 
integration (Brusoni et al. 2001; Hobday et al. 2005)  
 
Rapid, uneven innovation (Nelson & Winter 1982) destabilizes server system 
Error Swapping. Unable to unproblematically switch boards in a system (Swapping 
=> no need for system testing (Sanchez & Mahoney 1996) 
 
